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Shareholder activism in France is increasingly infl uenced by networks of 
hedge fund investors and other specialized players (including proxy advisory 
fi rms and investor associations). In the last few years, these networks have 
professionalized the way shareholder activism is conducted in the country. 
This report summarizes notable activism developments in France and 
examines the phenomenon of professionalization with two recent examples: 
the Suez-Gaz de France and the Atos Origin cases.
The Increasing Complexity of
Shareholder Activism in France
This report contributes to a specific understanding of 
shareholder activism influence on French companies. 
In France, the need for financial capital drove the govern-
ment and the business community to adopt select legal 
and institutional modifications1 imposed by Anglo-Saxon 
institutional investors.2 Changes in French legislation, 
accompanied by the rise of proxy-voting advisory firms 
and the search for innovative investment strategies by 
hedge funds, have strengthened the impact of institutional 
investor networks and led to increased professionalization 
of shareholder activism.
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Evolution in French shareholder rights legislation   Only a 
few years ago, a report demonstrated that an activist share-
holder’s announcement registered only a low level of public 
reaction (as measured by cumulative abnormal returns).3 
This finding could be explained by the passive role of insti-
tutional investors, which in turn was due to the following 
three constraints in French corporate law:
1 Prior to the 2001 New Economic Regulation Law, insti-
tutional investors needed to gather 10 percent of voting 
rights to be able to put forward a shareholder proposal. 
The 2001 New Economic Regulation reduced the thresh-
old to between 1 and 5 percent of voting rights, depending 
on the company’s market capitalization level.4
2 Until 2003, institutional investors were not required to 
report on the exercise of their voting rights attached to 
shares held by collective pension schemes. The 2003 
Financial Security Act established the principle that 
investment management companies must exercise the 
voting rights held by their funds “in the exclusive interest 
of […] shareholders and unitholders.” For any decision 
contrary to this general principle, asset managers are 
required to explain why they have not exercised those 
rights and “report their practices.”5
3 Before the publication of the 2005 Mansion Report, 
institutional investors had to suspend the public trading of 
their shares five days prior to the annual general meeting 
(AGM) of shareholders. The report included the recom-
mendation, which then became law, that a record date 
system be established. Under the new system, sharehold-
ers wishing to vote in general meetings have to produce a 
certificate proving that their shares have been blocked or 
recorded. Today, under the law, shareholders wishing to 
attend the meeting in person and who have not received 
their admission card before midnight Central European 
Time (CET) on the third business day before the meeting 
shall also be provided with a certificate.6
Before these three legislative changes, institutional inves-
tors preferred that investor associations improve the 
chances of shareholder activism success.7
Role and tactics of French investor associations   French 
investor associations generally initiate a legal action at an 
early stage in the activism process. The lawsuit may either 
replace or accompany other, more traditional, activism-
related activities. Immediately launching a lawsuit presents 
a number of advantages,8 including:
•  making use of legal loopholes;
•  threatening that an AGM be convened by a representative 
appointed by the court;
•  putting a halt to proceedings to gain time to undertake public 
engagement practices (such as seeking media coverage) 
and convince passive shareholders to coordinate their proxy 
voting actions; or
•  negotiating a higher exit premium during a takeover attempt.
The 2001 New Economic Regulation Law made an effort to 
close certain legal loopholes. However, research shows that 
the number of French investor associations has since con-
tinued to increase:9 currently, there are more than 20, each 
specializing in specific legal actions such as civil, criminal, 
or class actions. Prior to 2001, it was noted that 63 percent 
of activist activities took the form of a lawsuit and that 
subsequently this rate has fallen to less than one-third.10
More recently, investor associations such as l’Association 
Des Actionnaires Minoritaires (ADAM), have been col-
laborating regularly with hedge fund activists. As stated by 
Colette Neuville, the association’s leader, collaboration is 
offered “as long as [activists’] objectives go beyond the short 
term and help to create value for all the shareholders.”11
Role and tactics of activist hedge funds   The recent 
growth of the hedge fund industry in many countries has 
been fueled by the portfolio diversification strategies of 
pension funds. (Pension funds are heavily invested in alter-
native instruments, including hedge funds).12 To limit their 
capital investment and risk exposure, activist hedge funds 
enlist the outside support of institutional investors as well 
as fellow hedge funds.13
Activist hedge funds can leverage their relatively small 
stake in a target company through one or more tactics.14 
First, they can federate like-minded hedge funds. (In the 
United States a Schedule 13D disclosure form is filed as one 
“person” acting as a group for the purpose of acquiring, 
holding or disposing of securities of an issuer).15
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Second, activist hedge funds can act in so-called “wolf 
packs” of like-minded investors, avoiding disclosure under 
conditions in which their discussions or brainstorming are 
not deemed to constitute a “plan or proposal.”16 Without 
disclosure, the activists also avoid triggering a “poison pill” 
the company might have in place for defense.
Finally, studies have documented how activist hedge funds 
have learned to abuse the stock-lending market through a 
process called “empty voting.”17 With this technique, activ-
ist hedge funds borrow large blocks of shares just prior to 
the shareholder meeting record date for the sole purpose of 
influencing the outcome of a particular shareholder vote. 
Empty voting refers to the separation between voting rights 
and underlying economic interest in the corporation that 
results from deploying this technique.
Techniques like those mentioned above can reduce the costs 
(communication and share accumulation costs, in particular) 
incurred by an activist in reaching the threshold of voting 
rights necessary to put forward a shareholder proposal or to 
resist a management proposal. On this point, it is worth noting 
that in France, only 5 percent of voting rights are required 
to put a shareholder resolution on the agenda18 or to call an 
AGM.19 While this requirement might seem low, in practice 
it is not: more than half of AGMs in French companies occur 
only after they have been called a second time.20 The low level 
of shareholder participation in the AGM serves the inter-
ests of activist hedge funds, which often represent more than 
20 percent of the capital at the meeting.21 From 2005-2008, 
shareholder resolutions proposed by hedge funds received an 
average 45 percent approval rate at the AGMs of companies 
registered in the SBF 250 (Société des Bourses Françaises 250 
Index).22 Additional analysis of this data demonstrated that 
the higher the rate of participation from shareholders (other 
than the resolution sponsor), the lower the average rate of 
resolution approval at the AGM.23
Role and tactics of proxy advisory professionals   In 
the last decade, the French market has also witnessed 
the rise of a new category of professionals that includes 
RiskMetrics/Deminor, Proxinvest, and the France-based 
asset management association Association Française de 
Gestion (AFG). They offer proxy advisory and solicitation 
services that may enhance the effectiveness of the activist 
coalition’s campaign. Active investors are clearly influ-
enced by the recommendations issued by such advisors to 
vote for or against a proposal: in particular, AFG recom-
mendations encourage passive shareholders to vote in favor 
of proposals put forward by an activist coalition.24
These activist professionals play a dual informational role 
in the shareholder activism process.25 They certify the rela-
tive quality of competing management teams and corporate 
governance systems as well as predict activism outcomes by 
conveying new information to the market.
In conclusion, the emergence of activist hedge funds and 
proxy professionals has profoundly affected the French 
shareholder activism process, changing the way shareholder 
activism is conducted. To date, activist hedge funds and 
proxy professionals have targeted large French firms such 
as Vivarte, Alstom, Arcelor, Suez, Atos Origin, Carrefour, 
Valéo, Accor, and Saint-Gobain. See Table 1 (“Notable 
Cases of Shareholder Activism in France,” on page 5.)
The French Shareholder Activism Process
In general, shareholder activism is a multi-stage process, 
which only in certain circumstances is escalated to the 
most hostile stage.26
Target selection   The first stage involves target selec-
tion from a portfolio of firms. The choice of a target could be 
driven by a number of considerations relating to underperfor-
mance, governance, or social and environmental issues.27
Private engagement   The second stage—known as 
“behind-the-scenes” or “private-engagement” activism—
consists of collaborative informal communication activities 
(e.g., private meetings with the CEO and the chairman or 
meetings with board members).
Public engagement   In contrast, the third stage becomes 
confrontational as a result of the refusal by the target man-
agement to accommodate the changes sought by the activ-
ists. Known as “public engagement,” this stage refers to the 
proxy voting process to support a shareholder proposal or to 
contest a management proposal at the shareholder meeting. 
It may also be characterized by activities such as media 
coverage, lobbying initiatives, and a proxy battle.
In France, shareholder resolutions are rare. In its 2009 
European voting results report, RiskMetrics observed that 
only 21 shareholder proposals were submitted at French 
AGMs (among them, 15 were rejected) and out of 194 man-
agement proposals relating to share incentive plans, only 
four were subsequently withdrawn in response to objections 
from shareholders.
Hostility   Finally, the fourth stage is characterized by the 
most hostile degree of activism and can take the form of 
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a publicized exit by a dissatisfied shareholder, a takeover 
attempt, and/or a lawsuit.28
In the 2001-2004 period, a gradual increase in activist 
shareholder tactics has been observed among 71 French 
firms listed in the SBF index.29 Unlike the dynamic in 
the U.S. and the UK, in France, the proxy battle remains 
“the main vector of direct dialogue between the CEO and 
shareholders.”30
Similarly, there are documented positive correlations 
between legal actions and calls for extraordinary general 
meetings (EGM) of shareholders.31 In particular, when 
executive remuneration is the issue, shareholder activism 
appears to be most expressed through AGMs, through 
the courts, or by filing a complaint with the Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF).
However, as indicated earlier, the emergence of activist 
hedge funds and proxy voting professionals is exercising 
a profound influence on the French shareholder activism 
process. The next section describes the modus operandi of 
these new players.
The Modus Operandi of Three Professional 
Shareholder Activism Groups in France
This section examines the modus operandi of three share-
holder activism professionals that mobilize international 
investor networks and operate in the French market:
•  RiskMetrics/Deminor: a proxy analysis, voting recommenda-
tion and solicitation firm
•  Hermes EOS: a voting and private engagement network
•  CalPERS and Knight Vinke: an institutional investor/activist 
hedge fund network
RiskMetrics/Deminor In 2005, RiskMetrics (which owns 
Institutional Shareholder Services) acquired European 
shareholder-advocacy firm Deminor, becoming the world’s 
largest provider of proxy analysis and voting guidance, 
with a global client base of more than 1,700 investment 
institutions. RiskMetrics/Deminor operates in two ways: 
first, it helps clients create their own customized voting 
policies, which it subsequently executes on their behalf; 
second, it analyzes companies’ proxies and provides voting 
recommendations to clients who may follow them or use 
them as a baseline for their own voting decisions. 
Since many institutional investors do not have the internal 
capability to collect, translate, and analyze company proxy 
voting materials in time to vote, RiskMetrics’ recommen-
dations have become very influential, even in France.
Hermes Equity Ownership Services (EOS) As of the fourth 
quarter of 2010, Hermes EOS has over £60 billion of assets 
(approximately €71 billion or $93 billion) under steward-
ship for its network of institutional investor clients. Even 
when it is not responsible for investing its clients’ assets, the 
firm fulfills the fiduciary duty of its network of investors by 
voting their shares and engaging with companies to improve 
performance. Specifically, it executes voting in 6,000 com-
panies and represents its clients’ interests in engagements 
with 450 companies in nearly 50 countries annually.
EOS leverages its engagement impact with companies 
through its extensive network of formal and informal 
contacts with other fund managers whether or not they are 
clients of EOS. Discussions are kept private while they are 
proving constructive, or until the engagement is complete; 
in France, in particular, Hermes EOS recently decided not 
to disclose any information about its engagements with 
French companies other than to confirm that they engaged 
with Alcatel-Lucent, Galeries Lafayette and Vinci, and 
that they publicly engaged in specific networks to increase 
environmental, social, and governance standards in French 
listed corporations.32
CalPERS and Knight Vinke (KV) In 2007, the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) increased 
the fund’s corporate governance target to 5 percent of its 
total global equity portfolio (up from 3 percent).33 At the 
time of this re-allocation, that represented a maximum tar-
get level of $12.5 billion. Mainly through its fund dedicated 
to corporate governance, CalPERS invests in 10 hedge 
funds specialized in corporate governance activism, includ-
ing Knight Vinke (KV) in Europe. While KV takes the 
lead in initiating and coordinating an institutional investor 
network and related activism initiatives, CalPERS publicly 
supports KV and votes its shares with KV.
Table 1 on page 5 illustrates the professional players involved 
in France’s most notable cases of shareholder activism.
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Targeted firm Year Issues
Activism
stages
Type of activists (percentage 
of shareholding, when available)
Vivarte 2000 Alter business strategy: achieve operational efficiency
Improve governance: oust CEO
Public Raider: Guy Wyser Pratt
and Atticus (33%)
Alstom 2004 Improve governance: lawsuit against excessive
executive remuneration
Public and 
penal action
Investor association: APPAC
2008 Environmental, Social and Ethical issues Public UNPRI Sudan Engagement 
Group
Hermes EOS
Arcelor 2006 Alter business strategy: carry out M&A
Improve governance: rescind takeover defenses
Private Investor associations:
ADAM
APPAC
Goldman Sachs
Several hedge funds
2007 Other policies: stop unequal treatment of shareholders Threat of
legal action 
SRM
Suez 2006 Alter business strategy: opposed to the merger
between Suez and Gaz de France (spin-off)
Public and 
judicial
ADAM
Raider: Albert Frère
Knight Vinke (1%)
2008 Alter business strategy: obtain focus
(spin-offs, dismantle)
NA NA
Centaurus
Pardus
Atos Origin 2007 Alter business strategy: obtain focus
(spin-offs, dismantle)
Improve governance: oust CEO and
nominate independent board members
Public ADAM
Pardus (10.04%)
Centaurus (12.3%)
Carrefour 2008 Alter business strategy: obtain focus
(spin-offs, dismantle)
Public Raider: Arnault Group
Blue Capital (12.9%)
Valéo 2007 Improve governance: nominate board members Public Guy Wyser Pratt
Pardus (19.7%)
2008 Alter business strategy: obtain focus
(business restructuring)
Private Pardus (18.54%)
Accor 2008 Improve governance: oust CEO and
nominate board members
Alter business strategy: obtain focus
(spin-offs, dismantle)
Public Arnault Group
Private equity fund: Eurazeo
Blue Capital (10.7%)
Saint-Gobain 2008 Improve governance: change board members Private Wendel Investment (18%)
Table 1
Notable Cases of Shareholder Activism in France
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Two Case Studies of Shareholder Activism 
Networks in France
To illustrate how hedge funds and proxy-voting profession-
als in France mobilize investor networks in highly coordi-
nated activism campaigns, this report examines their role 
in the Suez-Gaz de France merger and a board restructur-
ing at ATOS Origin. Both cases are also indicative of the 
influence that the public sector still exercises in industrial 
and business relations in the country.
The role of hedge funds in activist networks: the Suez-
Gaz de France case34   As mentioned earlier, Knight Vinke 
(KV) is an activist hedge fund that typically targets large 
European companies, buying about 1 percent of their out-
standing shares and then persuading other investors to join 
its campaign to affect corporate strategy. Its flagship fund, 
which receives a significant investment from institutional 
investors like CalPERS, has more than $1.5 billion under 
management.
On July 22, 2004, the French government partially privat-
ized Gaz de France (GDF), while guaranteeing that it 
would not lower the number of publicly held shares below 
70 percent. On February 25, 2006, Dominique de Villepin, 
then Prime Minister of France, announced the merger of 
GDF and Suez, which effectively would lower the govern-
ment’s ownership stake in the merged entity to 34 percent. 
GDF’s unions and opposition political parties (communist 
and socialists) objected firmly to the transaction. The 
European regulatory authorities opened a lengthy antitrust 
investigation concerning the impact on competition in 
France and Belgium and imposed several divestments of 
Suez’s assets.
On September 3, 2006, Gaz de France and Suez announced 
their agreed terms of merger, which were based on the 
exchange of 21 Gaz de France shares for every 22 Suez 
shares via the absorption of Suez by Gaz de France. 
On September 7, 2006, an extremely contentious debate 
about the merger opened in the Assemblée Nationale, 
and by November 30, 2006, both the Sénat and Conseil 
Constitutionnel approved the merger, but it was stipulated 
that it could not take effect until July 1, 2007.
During September and October 2006, KV published 13 
full-page newspaper advertisements advocating that the 
two companies should strategically agree to a spin-off and 
publicly list Suez Environnement, a division of Suez.
On November 16, 2006, the French investor association 
ADAM publicly criticized the banks involved in the merger, 
notably HSBC, for their lack of independence in determining 
the share exchange ratio between GDF and Suez.
Suez owned Electrabel, the Belgian electricity company, 
whose significant shareholder, Albert Frère, demanded on 
November 21, 2006 a special dividend of €4 per share to 
compensate for the share exchange ratio. The same day, KV 
demanded a special dividend of €6.5 to €7 per share. The 
press speculated that KV was acting as a stalking horse for 
savvy Frère, who was vice-chairman of Suez and controlled 
7.2 percent of its stock through Groupe Bruxelles Lambert 
(GBL.) In fact, Eric Knight had once worked for Frère’s 
Pargesa Group.
On December 22, 2006, KV published an open letter in the 
French newspaper, Le Figaro, stating that the valuation of 
Suez’s shares under the merger proposal was insufficient, 
and recommended that Suez’s board suspend the merger. 
In the letter, KV reported that 18 of 20 major institutional 
investors, including CalPERS, had strong reservations 
about the merger.
On December 29, 2006, market rumors surfaced that 
François Pinault, another prominent French investor, might 
launch a takeover of Suez. As a result of these speculations, 
which continued throughout January 2007, the company’s 
share price rose. On January 4, 2007, President Jacques Chirac 
announced that the GDF Suez merger was a “strategic project 
for France and for Europe.” On January 12, Albert Frère 
increased his shareholding in Suez to 9.5 percent of capital.
Over the course of 10 days—ending on January 15, 2007, in 
the midst of this market speculation about Suez’s eventual 
ownership—KV sold its nearly 1 percent of Suez’s shares. 
At the same time, another group of professional activ-
ists invested in Suez’s equity. In the end, Suez’s environ-
mental division was listed separately on the French stock 
exchange, and the valuation for the remaining Suez stock 
improved in the merger. GDF Suez eventually merged on 
July 22, 2008.
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The role of proxy advisors in activist networks: the 
Atos Origin case   The activism process in Atos Origin, a 
French IT services company, began with private negotia-
tions between Centaurus, an activist hedge fund and the 
management of the target company. On October 23, 2006, 
Centaurus was the principle shareholder with 5.49 percent 
of shares. After the failure of negotiations, Centaurus 
joined with Pardus, (another hedge fund), and publicly 
announced a joint action “to put pressure on the board…
to explore all strategic alternatives” including “a disman-
tling.”35 Additional demands included board seats and the 
dismissal of Atos’ CEO, Philippe Germon. Two days before 
the public announcement, Pardus bought 7.32 percent of 
the shares and the voting rights of Atos Origin.
What makes this case particularly interesting is that the two 
funds also enlisted the services of local activist professionals, 
namely French investor association ADAM to support their 
proposals.36 The Atos Origin management convinced Investor 
Sight and Deminor, proxy-voting advisors to large networks of 
international investors, to support their position; in particular, 
Deminor maintained that Colette Neuville, ADAM CEO, 
lacked independence in the matter because of her business 
relations with Centaurus and Pardus.
On the basis of paper votes, Centaurus and Colette Neuville 
should have been elected to the board at the AGM, and the 
chairman, Didier Cherpitel, should have been dismissed.37 
However, CEO Philippe Germon reacted by adjourning the 
meeting when, unexpectedly, the chairman of the board of 
the Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) fund stated pub-
licly that he would use ESOP’s 3 percent voting rights
in favor of the activist coalition.
Eventually, on May 27, 2008, the two coalitions announced 
the end of their confrontation in the newspaper Les Echos. 
The activist coalition elected its members to the board, 
but agreed to sell its shares to PAI Partners, a European 
private equity firm.
In November 2008, Thierry Breton, the former French 
Minister of the Economy, replaced Philippe Germon at the 
helm of Atos Origin.
Atos Origin is an interesting case because of the direct 
intervention of the French government. Five days before 
the AGM, Senator Philippe Marini publicly expressed his 
concern and stated that Atos Origin risked being dismantled 
if the two funds, Centaurus and Pardus, were to succeed in 
taking control of it. This cultural context “…can create a strong 
support to managers’ entrenchment despite the relevance of 
strategic changes required by activists”38 and may explain the 
limited success of the activist coalition.
Conclusion
Specialized networks of dedicated investors and proxy-
voting professionals are expected to continue to exercise 
growing influence in French companies as these networks 
increase their ownership in French companies. The voice 
of professional shareholder activists in French corporate 
governance will be magnified further by recent changes to 
corporate law and shareholder rights.
The two studies discussed in this report suggest that share-
holder activism is a learning process that, in the future, 
may become the domain of dedicated professional services. 
In fact, with time, all players involved in the process—
including management, employee shareholders, the French 
government, investor associations, and activist sponsors 
themselves—are acquiring increasing levels of sophistica-
tion in their tactics.
On the other hand, compared to the U.S. context, the 
number of French corporations targeted by activist hedge 
funds remains low. As underlined by the two examples, 
French public authorities continue to lobby and exert their 
influence to retain their control of critical industrial and 
business sectors. These authorities can deter activism by 
increasing its cost—for hedge funds, and other players—
thereby undermining the probability of its success.
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